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by Augustus T. White*
Rochelle L. White
The recombinant DNA controversy is a
novel one, because proposed legislation is
aimed at the regulation of pure scientific
research rather than at the application of
technology.
In the case of DNA research, at least in
an academic setting, it would appear that
we are faced with a classical constitu-
tional confrontation. On the one hand,
fundamental civil liberties are involved.
On the other hand, it is argued that the
Commerce Clause and powers under Art.
I sec. 8 permit regulation in this area
because of the magnitude of the postul-
ated danger to public health. Unlike
many such conflicts, this need not be
resolved by the largely arbitrary applica-
tion of ideology. This is an issue of fact-
namely, whether there is a significant
danger to the public.
*Ph.D. candidate in Biochemistry, Johns Hopkins
University.
There is at present no scientific data to
support the contention that recombinant
DNA research poses a hazard to the
public health. Government efforts to ob-
tain such data have been minimal, and
the results have been uniformly negative.
Rigid regulation based on supposition
would remove all limits on government
power to regulate under the Welfare
Clause since we are increasingly finding
that there are few if any activities which
do not to some extent affect the public
health.
INTRODUCTION
If genetic manipulation is defined as the
attempt to develop biological entities
with a genetic make-up not found in
nature, then mankind has practiced this
science for thousands of years. It is
doubtful that anyone questioned the
propriety of domesticating and breeding
cattle or that people were frightened by
the development of the nectarine. Cur
rently, however, we are witnessing
widespread public fervor concerning re-
cent experiments labelled "recombinant
DNA work."
What isolates the recombinant DNA ex
periments from past genetic manipulation
is the fact that, for the first time, a novel
genome (one haploid set of chromosomes
with the genes they contain) is being
developed in vitro (outside the cell). This
operational difference has spurred fears of
"test tube life" and has raised moral
issues concerning a "breach of the natural
evolutionary barrier" between higher and
lower organisms.
SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION
It must be stressed that DNA by itself is
simply a large fragile molecule sensitive
to heat, light, chemicals, and degredation
by omnipresent bacteria and fungi. In
order to function at all, the DNA must be
inside a cell (often in a particular part of
that cell) which is healthy and equipped
by evolution and development to "under-
stand" the code of the particular DNA in
question. No one could possibly claim
that ingestion of large quantities of
foreign DNA, for example in a rare steak,
was dangerous or even unpleasant.
Before the advent of recombinant DNA
technology, scientists wishing to study
the nature of gene function in higher
organisms were faced with a problem.
Most DNA sequences of interest are pre-
sent in only one copy per cell genome.
This is such a minute quantity that it
would take pounds of cell tissue to isolate
just a microgram of the desired DNA. For
technical reasons this is simply not possi-
ble in most cases. Recombinant DNA in-
volves insertion of a piece of DNA into the
genome of a very simple organism or
virus. As this simple DNA replicates, so
does the inserted piece, and it becomes
possible to grow and harvest workable
quantities of specific genes in pure form.
It is therefore easy to see why the process
is helpful to molecular biologists.
The actual technique involved in
recombinant DNA work varies somewhat
from experiment to experiment. Basically,
the DNA of interest is spliced together
(ligated) with the DNA of a vector to form
one continuous molecule. The vector, the
biological entity that will actually carry
the foreign DNA, may be of two kinds.
Most commonly, plasmids are used. These
are self -replicating DNA molecules which
are carried along inside bacteria. More re-
cently a kind of bacterial virus, the
lambda phage, has been used.
The ligated DNA is allowed to enter
specially treated bacterial cells. The bac-
terium universally used has been
Escherichia coli (E. coli) strain K12, a
close relative of the strain found in the
human digestive tract. In the case of
plasmids the vectors are simply allowed to
replicate, and their number increases as
the bacterium itself continues to grow and
divide. In the case of the phage, the vector
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DNA directs the assembly of mature
phage particles which eventually destroy
the bacterial cell and are released to infect
more bacteria.
One of the difficulties in dealing with
the recombinant DNA question is the con-
fusion that has arisen about what recom-
binant DNA is not. Recombinant DNA
technique is not, for example, "cloning."
Cloning is the process of taking one cell
from an organism and growing from it
either more identical cells or a new,
genetically identical organism. Cloning is
often used in recombinant DNA work in
the sense of growing many identical bac-
teria from a single cell, and the word is
used synonymously with recombinant
DNA because the object of the technique
is to "clone" chemically identical DNA
molecules. Nevertheless cloning does not
per se involve recombinant DNA work.
Recombinant DNA technique is not
"genetic engineering." Right now such
engineering is beyond our capabilities for
anything larger than a small virus. Bac-
teria and other cells have been
"engineered" by conventional means for
many years. Certainly recombinant DNA
technique might be used for such a pur-
pose, but thus far it has not been possible.
Recombinant DNA technique is not
even the articifical transfer of genes from
one organism to another kind of organ-
ism. This is often done in recombinant
DNA work, but there are at least five
other ways of doing this. One of these,
bacterial transformation, has been prac-
ticed routinely since 1946.
HISTORY OF THE CONTROVERSY
The history of the recombinant DNA
dispute is unusual because it was a group
of scientists who first began questioning
the work of their colleagues. This concern
was first voiced as early as the summer of
1971. By the summer of 1973, there was
some anxiety within the scientific com-
munity at large. About one hundred forty
molecular biologists attending the Gorden
Conference in New Hampshire sent a let-
ter to Science' voicing their concern.
They also requested that the National
Academy of Sciences undertake an in
vestigation into the likelihood of risk in
volved in recombinant DNA research. The
investigatory committee formed by the
Academy responded in April 1974 by ap-
pealing to researchers nationwide to put a
temporary halt to all recombinant DNA
work. Again, a group of concerned
molecular biologists met, at Asilomar,
California in February, 1975. A few law-
yers met with the one hundred thirty-four
scientists to discuss the legal ramifications
of the work. The research ban was con-
tinued, and it was determined by those
present that precautions should be taken
to insure safety in any future work. The
National Institutes of Health (NIH) was
asked to step in.
THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF
HEALTH GUIDELINES
NIH issued guidelines in the summer of
1976. The guidelines set up two kinds of
containment for conducting recombinant
DNA experiments. The first type is physi-
cal containment. This involves a protocol
of laboratory procedures, microbiological
technique, and facility requirements to be
followed depending on the experimental
material used. The various levels of physi-
cal containment are denoted P1 through
P4.
The second type, biological contain-
ment, is more complex since it involves
two different variables-the form of E.
coil K12 (EK) used and the host-vector
system (HV) employed. The levels of
biological containment are determined ac-
cording to the natural infectivity of the
vector to hosts found in nature and of the
hosts to higher organisms.
The NIH guidelines apply only to
federally funded research. This encom-
passes not only universities and public
research institutions, but also any private
research institution receiving federal aid
and any private companies which depend
on federal contracts or large federal or-
ders. The guidelines would not, however,
apply to private industry pursuing this
line of research with purely private funds.
In addition, the NIH guidelines are not
equivalent to law. No legal sanctions are
imposed on the violators, only economic
sanctions. An individual researcher who
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disregards the guideline safety standards
could lose his or her grant which, in effect,
would halt further research. The institu-
tion in which such work was being con-
ducted could also find itself without
further federal funding. Other facilities
not directly funded by the federal govern-
ment could be injured economically
through loss of government contracts or
loss of government orders for supplies.
PUBLIC REACTION
The Asilomar Conference took place in
February, 1975. At about this time re-
porters became interested in the debate.
Many of the resulting articles resembled
science fiction scenarios rather than
responsible journalism, often predicting a
future of genetic mutants ruling the earth.
But the reports did bring the situation to
the attention of the general public. In par-
ticular, Cambridge's Mayor Velluci
became worried about the recombinant
DNA experiments being conducted at
Harvard University and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. He asked the
Cambridge city council to put a ban on all
such research within the city limits.
Although guidelines from the NIH had
been published in the summer of 1976
and the self-imposed ban had been lifted,
Mayor Velluci felt that community safety
required a "100% guarantee" that such
research was safe.' In February, 1977,
however, the city council adopted the
standard of "reasonable likelihood" that
such research was safe and passed an ordi-
nance allowing recombinant DNA
research under conditions slightly more
stringent than the NIH guidelines.
3
Other localities had become caught-up
in the controversy. Restrictive legislation
was proposed at San Diego, California
and Ann Arbor, Michigan where some
work was also being conducted. Similar
legislation was introduced at Princeton,
New Jersey where no recombinant DNA
work was under way or had even been
proposed. At the state level, both New
York and California began considering
new legislation aimed at regulating scien-
tific experimentation and the establish-




It was primarily because of two factors,
the hodgepodge of local regulation pro-
posed and the fact that private industry is
not bound by the NIH guidelines, that na-
tional legislation was felt to be necessary.
The U.S. Department of Commerce had
offered to expedite the patents on recom-
binant DNA techniques submitted if in-
dustry would state its intention to follow
NIH safety procedures. The following
month, March, 1977, the twenty-five man
Presidential task force assigned to in-
vestigate the situation made its official re
port. The task force felt that there were no
existing federal agencies with authority to
monitor compliance with the NIH
guidelines or to extend NIH restrictions to
industry.4 Within a week of this announ-
cement Congressman Paul Rogers (D-
Fla.) introduced a bill to the House Sub-
committee on Science, Research and
Technology. That same month Senator
Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) submitted his
own bill to the Senate Subcommittee on
Health.
Both bills relied on the Commerce
Clause to bring private industry into the
area of government regulation. Each bill
made provision for licensing facilities and
monitoring compliance, but they differed
in the extent of control exercised by the
local biohazard committees. The bills im-
posed legal sanctions on the violators
although the Kennedy bill was harsher.
Although they were aimed at uniformity
and provided for federal preemption, the
Kennedy bill set forth circumstances in
which local communities could impose
stricter regulation. The major difference
between the two bills was that, while all
administrative and monitoring policy
under the House bill would be conducted
by HEW, the Senate bill called for crea-
tion of a new executive agency.
In June, 1977 both bills passed their
respective subcommittees. The House
bill, H.R.7897, was passed on to the
Commerce Committee, and from there it
was passed on to the full committee on
Science and Technology. Senate bill
S.1217 passed the Committee on Human
Resources and was adopted as the official
Senate version. There was surprisingly lit
tie comment made. Only Senator Gaylord
Nelson (D-Wis.) voiced concern over
some of the bill's provisions. In August,
1977 he introduced his own version, pro-
posed as an amendment (No. 754) to
S.1217 in the nature of a substitute.
Senator Nelson's bill is substantially the
same as H.R. 7897.
CHANGING OPINIONS &
LEGISLATIVE SLOWDOWN
The following months were quiet ones
in terms of news coverage of the con-
troversy but were probably the most tur-
bulent in terms of biologists' reactions to
the proposed legislation. Presently,
molecular biologists are almost un-
animously opposed to the proposed
federal legislation. Most term it "frighten-
ing," and have felt it necessary to form
lobbying groups to oppose it.' Originally,
few scientists were willing to involve
themselves in the controversy and oppose
restrictions because they could not argue
that the research is entirely devoid of risk
and thus, should not be controlled. The
scientists, however, underestimated the
publicity dynamite in recombinant DNA
and did not foresee the form legislation
would take. Scientists are agitated over
the fact that Congress seems likely to es-
tablish a complex machinery of red tape
instead of simply writing the NIH
guidelines into legally enforceable form.
In the past three years numerous
studies have been conducted to determine
the hazards potentially associated with
gene-splicing experiments. It has now
been determined that such hazards are far
more remote than was earlier estimated.
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At the 1977 Gorden Conference, over se-
venty-five percent of the attendees ex-
pressed their alarm at the direction
biohazard legislation was taking.
Because the Gorden Conference is at-
tended by scientists actively involved in
DNA research, the newly voiced opposi
tion is of course in their own interest, but
it also appears to be the consensus among
researchers in general. A large body of
scientists who had originally been op-
posed to recombinant DNA research have
evinced a total turn-around of opinion.
This is due to recent findings concerning
the hazards. In April, 1977, Roy Curtiss III
of the University of Alabama presented
his findings to the director of NIH.
Although he had been one of the early
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leaders of opposition to recombinant DNA
research, Dr. Curtiss, through his study,
had convinced himself that the dangers, if
any, were minimal. The Curtiss paper has
had a big impact on Capitol Hill because
he had not been an active participant in
the research and his "defection" could not
be attributed to self-interest.
Scientists' apprehensions about im-
pending legislation were generally
directed against Senator Edward Ken-
nedy's bill. Americans for Democratic Ac-
tion and other civil libertarians had joined
those arguing against strict societal con-
trol of science and warned that Congress
was "attempting to control specific ac-
tivities through individual licensing and
punitive action."' 7 Many believe that the
vast and cumbersome bureaucracy this
legislation would impose is a serious im-
pediment to research and may constitute
'prior restraint."
On September 22, 1977, Senator Adlai
Stevenson, Jr. (D-Ill.) published in the
Congressional Record a series of letters
between himself and Dr. Frank Press, the
Science Advisor to the President. In these
letters he urged that any legislation
enacted be "interim in character and per-
mit great flexibility in accomodating to
the scientific evidence as it is developed."
Five days later, Senator Kennedy an-
nounced his intention to withdraw his bill
in light of the fact that recent evidence
suggested that risks upon which it had
been based were overstated. Congress-
man Paul Rogers also moderated his origi-
nal bill.
By late autumn a Congressional
deadlock had formed. Because H.R. 7897
failed to leave the full House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, it
did not reach the floor of the House this
last legislative session. Representative
Paul Rogers has now produced a new in-
terim bill to break this deadlock. The bill
puts all recombinant DNA research under
NIH guidelines for the next two years
while a commission further studies the
matter. Guideline violators would be sub-
ject to civil penalties or suspension of
research funds. In the meantime, legis-
lative supporters hope that the controver-
sial issues of prior disclosure requirements
and federal preemption will be ironed out.
The administration, however, is still try-
ing to develop a regulatory framework
through existing legislation. Section 361
of the Public Health Act gives the HEW
Secretary the power to make regulations
necessary "to prevent the introduction,
transmission, or spread of communicable
disease." This might be a broad enough
grant of power to encompass recombinant
DNA research.
PROS AND CONS-IS REGULATION
NECESSARY?
Many of the problems with recombi-
nant DNA work stem from the fact that
the host bacterium used has been, in ev-
ery case, Escherichia coli, found com-
monly in normal human intestines and in
sewage. If genes inserted into the vectors
previously described were to establish
themselves in human populations, it is
argued that genetic transfer could take
place between vector DNA and human
cells. Thus cloning of a hypothetical
cancer virus is felt to raise the spectre of
an unstoppable cancer plague. A similar
line of reasoning applies to projected ex
periments with genetic manipulation of
food crops.
A second problem is, ironically, the
same that confronted molecular biologists
in the beginning. Since it is virtually im-
possible to isolate a specific gene se-
quence from a higher organism, the
recombinant DNA is necessarily diverse.
In practice, hundreds or thousands of
different clones are created in "shotgun"
experiments, a very few of which are
selected for in later tests. Thus in an at-
tempt to clone a completely harmless
gene, a cancer or other virus may also be
cloned.
Finally, although both the vectors and
E. coli strains used in the laboratory are
genetically modified against survival out-
side of rigid, artificial conditions, such
"debilitated" particles may transfer DNA
to non-debilitated strains which can
spread rapidly. Similarly, in some cases,
some of the debilitated characteristics
may revert to normal function by muta-
tion.
Potential hazards are not confined to
the fear of uncontrollable plauges or other
disasters. There are also the "hazards of
success." The term "hazards of success"
is due to Dr. Liebe F. Cavalieri of the
Sloan-Kettering Institute.8 Under this
heading we (but not necessarily Dr.
Cavalieri) include the political, philisophi-
cal, and very long-term effects of recom-
binant DNA work. Dr. Cavalieri has
noted, for example, disruption of Earth's
ecosystem through the creation of novel
organisms having no natural enemies or
limits. Others are worried on religious or
philisophical grounds about tampering
with "the nature of life." Finally, there is
concern that the control of genetic com-
position and expression may lead to the
creation of new types of man; either
supermen with elitist proclivities or mind-
less slaves of the state. Certainly such
speculations are rather far removed from
realistic scientific and legal questions.
To be weighted against such possible
dangers are the possible benefits.
Foremost on this list is the vast amount of
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information that could be revealed
regarding the cause of cancer.
Chemotherapy is treatment of symptoms,
removal of carcinogens from the environ-
ment is prophyllaxis, while recombinant
DNA research offers the possibility of a
cure. The more obvious medical benefits
include curing inherited diseases through
genetic surgery. Insulin for diabetics and
clotting factor for hemophiliacs could be
produced in large quantities and at greatly
reduced cost. Antibiotics and vaccines
could be produced inexpensively. There
are also environmental uses for the tech-
nique. Hypothetical benefits include
nitrogen fixing plants which would elimi-
nate the need for costly fertilizers.
Perhaps a microbe could be developed
which would digest oil spills or feed ex-
clusively on other pollutants.
These speculative benefits now appear
to be very real. In June, a team of
researchers at the University of California,
San Francisco succeeded in isolating the
rat gene which codes for insulin.9 Last fall,
another team of California researchers
from UCSF, the City of Hope Medical
Center, and the Salk Institute, were suc-
cessful in using an altered microbe to
make a copy of a mammalian brain hor-
mone that can act biologically in
humans.' 0 These are giant steps toward
the mass production of insulin as well as
hormones and enzymes needed by the
hundreds of thousands who suffer various
forms of genetic disorders.
CONCLUSION
One of the legal and legislative trends
of this country has been the shift from
compensation for injury to prevention. In
consequence, the burden of responsibility
for safety has shifted from the final con-
sumer of goods and services to the initial
producer. Americans feel that no one
should be exposed to any risk not of his
own making.
While there is some justice in this view,
there is very little truth. Not only is it im
possible to control all the risks of every-
day life, we doubt that it is even desirable.
Nowhere is this more true than in pure
science since the business of science is the
unknown, and the unknown is inherently
risky. Heedless of this fact, we have re-
I
cently, in the recombinant DNA debates,
seen society demanding of scientists that
they somehow guarantee the future.
Further, applying this same faulty logic to
science as to other areas of production, we
now intend to supervise the unknown so
that it, too, will always be safe.
What has caused our personal opposi-
tion to regulation is the fact that the legis-
lation is aimed at hindering scientific in-
vestigation and not just the application of
known principle. The overhwelming cry
has been to prevent problems similar to
those we now face in the area of atomic
energy. Our problem with this argument
is that we cannot hold with forbidding ac-
cumulation of any type knowledge. It may
well be the most effective preventive of
future problems but it also almost cer-
tainly prevents discovery of present solu-
tions as well. We feel that science is one
of the indispensible cogs of our society
and as long as this is true, a certain in
calculable amount of danger must be
faced by us all as an alternative to sure
stagnation and decay.
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Until early last year Bud Harper, a 46 year-old automobile mechanic, lived happily and
quietly with his wife and two children in San Francisco, California. One afternoon he
returned early from work and announced to his family that he was no longer employed. His
wife asked him if he had been fired or had quit. He responded, "quit, fired, what difference
does it make? Quid pro quo, n'est-ce pas?" Shortly thereafter Harper, possessing only a
high school diploma, purchased a three-piece suit and began prowling the halls of the San
Francisco Federal District Court Building with the explanation that he was looking for
"clients" to "represent." Mrs. Harper, alarmed by these events, convinced her husband to
see a doctor who diagnosed the malady as Neuro-Jurism. Since that time, Harper has
deteriorated rapidly and is being kept alive only by forced intra-venous feedings, having
refused solid food "as a personal protest against the Federal Court system's recent, dan-
gerous trend regarding restrictive jurisdictional and standing requirements."
David Jalowsky is an all-pro linebacker for the National Football League's Green Bay
Packers. During a recent game against the Philadelphia Eagles, Jalowsky mishandled a
simple, rather routine blocking maneuver. Following the game, a member of the press
questioned him as to the cause of such a glaring error. In response, Jalowsky said, "I
assessed the situation on the field at the time and felt that rather than place myself in an
adversarial position with the opposing team, I would attempt instead a negotiated settle-
ment benefitting all concerned." David Jalowsky has N.J.
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